Nokia Quietly Launches N-Gage; Details From the Show Floor

After months of anticipation on when Nokia (NYSE: NOK) would launch its gaming platform called N-Gage, the world's largest handset maker did it quietly this morning when it let the Web site go live worldwide. Nokia spokeswoman Camilla Pagliaroli said from CTIA that, the formal announcement will go out on Monday, but it is already selling six games for five handsets as of today. The Monday release may include the launch of more games, and details on other handsets that will be supported in the future.

Game developers are hopeful that N-Gage will lead to a second stage of higher-quality gaming that will drive sales, and it's a big part of Nokia's push at becoming a content company (The WSJ reported details on the market opportunity—Gartner expects revenues to hit $9.6 billion by 2011). The platform supports 3D graphics, and will eventually span many devices. Originally, Nokia's N-Gage was a specific gaming device, now it's a platform that can run on many devices. Pagliaroli said the platform is designed to push developer's imaginations. She said when developers should incorporate community features, where players can play another person from across the world, or use the phone's camera or other high-end features. In a kick-boxing game called The One, the graphics are console-like quality, another neat feature is that messages can appear overlaid on the screen as they arrive.

N-Gage can either be downloaded online and sideloaded to the phone, or bought on the handset. Users are able to try the games before they buy. They range from $7 and $13, and there are different prices for whether they want them for a week, a month or longer. On the Web site today, Gameloft's (EPA: GFT) Asphalt 3: Street Rules, was available, and there was one player, and two reviews already posted. One simply said: "I love it."

Related

@ CTIA: Nokia Launches Its First WiMax Device 180 Feet In The Air
@ CTIA: Billboard Mobile: Nokia Discusses Upcoming 'Comes With Music' Service
Nokia Roundup: Launches Music Service In Germany; Settles Qualcomm Spat; N-Gage Coming
Nokia Wins UK Patent Spat Against Qualcomm; Commercial Launch of Nokia's N-Gage "In Few Weeks"

Quiet Period Is Ending; Qualcomm, Verizon And Others Address Spectrum Auction

The high-profile spectrum auction ended two weeks ago, but the really interesting information is only starting to come out now that the quiet period has ended. The FCC, which garnered nearly $20 billion from the auction, prohibited the winning companies from saying anything about what they were going to do with the spectrum until 6 p.m. Eastern today. The timing was lousy given that it coincided with the industry's big annual event—CTIA. Arun Sarin, the CEO of Vodafone (NYSE: VOD), which owns about half of Verizon Wireless (NYSE: VZ) and happened to be the biggest winner of the auction, even joked about it yesterday, saying everyone will have to wait another 24 hours for an update. Verizon Wireless said today it will hold a Webcast tomorrow to discuss its plans.

Qualcomm (NSDQ: QCOM) also stayed quiet. I met with Qualcomm MediaFLO division yesterday, when they refused to say anything, but today, they announced the spectrum will indeed be used for its MediaFLO TV service. It said it paid $558.1 million for licenses including the E block covering Boston, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia and San Francisco. Qualcomm said: "These licenses double Qualcomm's 700 MHz spectrum holdings throughout a footprint of more than 68 million people in 28 individual markets," the company said.

With the additional licenses, MediaFLO will be able to deliver additional content and services in these top markets, which is precisely what I chatted with Omar Javaid, the vp of global business opportunities, about. He said already they are starting to see what users prefer, and they were surprised to learn that people didn't want bite-sized content like a lot of people assumed, but preferred full-length TV shows. AT&T (NYSE: T), which is launching in May, even included a channel by Sony (NYSE: SNE) which will play full-length movies. But moving beyond even those basic services, he said they will develop future services, including chat and voting capabilities.

Here's A Way To Get Operators To Cut Costs: Out Them In Public

Here's a novel way to shame operators into cutting their data and text costs: shame them in public. At least that's what Viviane Reding, European telecom regulator, is proposing to do if the local operators don't cut costs for roaming text messaging and wholesale data transmission by July 1, reports IHT.

"I will look at all the tariffs available and put them on a Web site...That way, people will be able to see which ones have not lowered their prices," said the always plucky Reding. This isn't the first time this clash has happened, and it won't be the last, for sure.

She asked that the price of a SMS sent outside of one's home country be capped at 12 euro cents, down from the average of 29 cents in Europe and 23 cents in France. She also requested a cut in wholesale prices for data roaming..some operators charge as much as Euro 11, or $17 per MB of data transmitted outside of their home country, but most charge Euro 5 to Euro 7, she said, which is still crazy pricing. She would like to see those roaming wholesale prices cut to 35 euro cents per MB.

Related

T-Mobile To Cut European Mobile Data Roaming Charges
EU Telecoms Commissioner Reiterates Need For Mobile Data Roaming Price Cuts
Reding Slaps 'Wishful-Thinking' 3G Bidders, Urges Spectrum Reform Support
Five European Operators Cut Mobile Data Roaming Charges
Ofcom Takes Aim At Pricey Mobile Data Roaming Charges

Local Matters Acquires Local Mobile Search Firm mobilePeople

Media technology provider Local Matters is acquiring Danish local mobile search and advertising provider mobilePeople. The Denver, Colorado-based firm, which specializes in local search, will acquire all of the outstanding capital stock of mobilePeople in exchange for a combination of cash and Local Matters stock. No financial details of the deal were disclosed. The buy out means that Local Matters will now be able to offer directory publishers, media publishers and directory assistance providers with their local search technology across the internet, mobile and voice. The two companies are already familiar with one another, having formed a business partnership two years ago. They have several joint initiatives in progress. The transaction is expected to close in the second quarter of 2008 (release).

Install Manifests

←Older revision Revision as of 02:27, 20 March 2008 Line 370: Line 370: <noinclude> <noinclude>  +[[zh-cn:Install_Manifests]] [[es:Instalar el manifest]] [[es:Instalar el manifest]] [[fr:Manifestes d'installation]] [[fr:Manifestes d'installation]]

Category:Extensions

←Older revision Revision as of 02:23, 20 March 2008 Line 5: Line 5: [[Category:All Categories]] [[Category:All Categories]]  +[[zh-cn:Category:Extensions]] [[ja:Category:Extensions]] [[ja:Category:Extensions]] [[pl:Kategoria:Rozszerzenia]] [[pl:Kategoria:Rozszerzenia]]

XMLHttpRequest

added mozBackgroundRequest

←Older revision Revision as of 02:05, 20 March 2008 Line 113: Line 113: req.send(null); req.send(null); dump("Content-Type: " + req.getResponseHeader("Content-Type") + "\n"); dump("Content-Type: " + req.getResponseHeader("Content-Type") + "\n");  +</pre>  +  +===mozBackgroundRequest===  +This property can be used to cause the request to disable authentication and bad certificate dialogs. The request is also not part of a window's loadgroup and so is not closed if the window is closed. {{fx_minversion_inline|3}}  +<pre>  +var req = new XMLHttpRequest();  +req.mozBackgroundRequest = true;  +req.open('GET', 'http://www.mozilla.org/', true);  +req.send(null); </pre> </pre>

Using XPath

getXPathForElement - +comment

←Older revision Revision as of 01:55, 20 March 2008 Line 9: Line 9: For a very simple XPath usage example, see: [[Code_snippets:HTML_to_DOM#Using_a_hidden_XUL_iframe_.28complete_example.29]] For a very simple XPath usage example, see: [[Code_snippets:HTML_to_DOM#Using_a_hidden_XUL_iframe_.28complete_example.29]] -==Wrapper function==+==Node-specific evaluator function== The following function can be used to evaluate XPath expressions on given XML nodes. The first argument is a DOM node or Document object, while the second is a string defining an XPath expression. The following function can be used to evaluate XPath expressions on given XML nodes. The first argument is a DOM node or Document object, while the second is a string defining an XPath expression. Line 44: Line 44: If you are using [[XMLHttpRequest]] to read a local or remote XML file into a DOM tree (as described in [[Parsing and serializing XML]]), the first argument to <code>evaluateXPath()</code> should be <code>req.responseXML</code>. If you are using [[XMLHttpRequest]] to read a local or remote XML file into a DOM tree (as described in [[Parsing and serializing XML]]), the first argument to <code>evaluateXPath()</code> should be <code>req.responseXML</code>. -==Sample usage==+===Sample usage=== Assume we have the following XML document (see also [[How to Create a DOM tree]] and [[Parsing and serializing XML]]): Assume we have the following XML document (see also [[How to Create a DOM tree]] and [[Parsing and serializing XML]]): Line 81: Line 81: alert(results.length); alert(results.length); </pre> </pre>  +  +==getXPathForElement==  +  +The following function allows one to pass an element and an XML document to find a unique string XPath expression leading back to that element.  +  +<pre>function getXPathForElement(el, xml) {  + var xpath = '';  + var pos, tempitem2;  +  + while(el !== xml.documentElement) {  + pos = 0;  + tempitem2 = el;  + while(tempitem2) {  + if (tempitem2.nodeType === 1 && tempitem2.nodeName === el.nodeName) { // If it is ELEMENT_NODE of the same name  + pos += 1;  + }  + tempitem2 = tempitem2.previousSibling;  + }  +  + xpath = el.nodeName+'['+pos+']'+'/'+xpath;  + el = el.parentNode;  + }  + xpath = '/'+xml.documentElement.nodeName+'/'+xpath;  + xpath = xpath.replace(/\/$/, '');  + return xpath;  +}</pre> ==Resources== ==Resources==

Code snippets:File I/O

Writing to a file

←Older revision Revision as of 00:39, 20 March 2008 Line 290: Line 290: // use 0x02 | 0x10 to open file for appending. // use 0x02 | 0x10 to open file for appending. -foStream.init(file, 0x02 | 0x08 | 0x20, 0666, 0); // write, create, truncate+foStream.init(file, 0x02 | 0x08 | 0x20, 0666, 0); -In a c file operation, we have no need to set file mode with or operation, directly using "r" or "w" usually.+// write, create, truncate  +// In a c file operation, we have no need to set file mode with or operation,  +// directly using "r" or "w" usually. foStream.write(data, data.length); foStream.write(data, data.length); foStream.close(); foStream.close();

Introduction to using XPath in JavaScript

small positioning fix

←Older revision Revision as of 00:11, 20 March 2008 Line 299: Line 299: {{XPathResultConstants}} {{XPathResultConstants}}  +  +=See also=  +* [[Using XPath]] <div class="originaldocinfo"> <div class="originaldocinfo">

XPathResult

+see also, +cat

←Older revision Revision as of 00:08, 20 March 2008 Line 31: Line 31: {{XPathResultConstants}} {{XPathResultConstants}}  +  +==See also==  +  +* [[DOM:document.evaluate|document.evaluate()]]  +  +[[Category:XPath]]

DOM:document.evaluate

Result types - +q about merging with another template

←Older revision Revision as of 00:06, 20 March 2008 Line 36: Line 36: == Result types == == Result types ==  +  +(Merge with [[Template:XPathResultConstants]]?  + These are supported values for the <code>resultType</code> parameter of the <code>evaluate</code> method: These are supported values for the <code>resultType</code> parameter of the <code>evaluate</code> method: {| class="standard-table" {| class="standard-table" Line 103: Line 106: [[pl:DOM:document.evaluate]] [[pl:DOM:document.evaluate]]  +  +[[Category:XPath]]

Template:XPathResultConstants

adding page

New page

{| class="standard-table"
|-
|class="header"|Result Type Defined Constant
|class="header"|Value
|class="header"|Description
|-
|-
|ANY_TYPE
|0
|A result set containing whatever type naturally results from evaluation of the expression. Note that if the result is a node-set then UNORDERED_NODE_ITERATOR_TYPE is always the resulting type.
|-
|-
|NUMBER_TYPE
|1
|A result containing a single number. This is useful for example, in an XPath expression using the <code>count()</code> function.
|-
|-
|STRING_TYPE
|2
|A result containing a single string.
|-
|-
|BOOLEAN_TYPE
|3
|A result containing a single boolean value. This is useful for example, in an XPath expression using the <code>not()</code> function.
|-
|-
|UNORDERED_NODE_ITERATOR_TYPE
|4
|A result node-set containing all the nodes matching the expression. The nodes may not necessarily be in the same order that they appear in the document.
|-
|-
|ORDERED_NODE_ITERATOR_TYPE
|5
|A result node-set containing all the nodes matching the expression. The nodes in the result set are in the same order that they appear in the document.
|-
|-
|UNORDERED_NODE_SNAPSHOT_TYPE
|6
|A result node-set containing snapshots of all the nodes matching the expression. The nodes may not necessarily be in the same order that they appear in the document.
|-
|-
|ORDERED_NODE_SNAPSHOT_TYPE
|7
|A result node-set containing snapshots of all the nodes matching the expression. The nodes in the result set are in the same order that they appear in the document.
|-
|-
|ANY_UNORDERED_NODE_TYPE
|8
|A result node-set containing any single node that matches the expression. The node is not necessarily the first node in the document that matches the expression.
|-
|-
|FIRST_ORDERED_NODE_TYPE
|9
|A result node-set containing the first node in the document that matches the expression.
|-
|}

Code snippets:Miscellaneous

Operating system detection

←Older revision Revision as of 20:51, 19 March 2008 Line 16: Line 16: ==Operating system detection== ==Operating system detection== - // Returns WINNT on Windows XP, 2000, NT and returns Linux on GNU/Linux+ // Returns "WINNT" on Windows Vista, XP, 2000, and NT systems  + // and returns "Linux" on GNU/Linux var osString = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/xre/app-info;1"] var osString = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/xre/app-info;1"] .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIXULRuntime).OS; .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIXULRuntime).OS;

nsIUpdateTimerManager

new

New page

<breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs>
The <code>nsIUpdateTimerManager</code> interface provides a global application service that provides support for long-duration timers (on the order of many days, weeks, or even months). These timers are used to schedule update checks in the future, for example.

__TOC__
{{InterfaceStatus|nsIUpdateTimerManager|toolkit/mozapps/update/public/nsIUpdateService.idl|unfrozen|Mozilla 1.9|yes}}

Inherits from: {{interface|nsISupports}}

=Method overview=

{| class="standard-table"
|-
| <code>void [[#registerTimer()|registerTimer]](in AString id,
in nsITimerCallback callback,
in unsigned long interval);</code>
|-
|}

=Methods=

==registerTimer()==
Presents a user interface that checks for and displays the available updates.

void registerTimer(
in AString id,
in nsITimerCallback callback,
in unsigned long interval
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>

;<tt>id</tt>
:An ID used to identify the timer interval; used for persistence.
;<tt>callback</tt>
:An {{interface|nsITimerCallback}} object that is notified when the interval expires.
;<tt>interval</tt>
:The length of time, in seconds, until the timer should fire.

None.

=See also=

* {{interface|nsIUpdate}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateCheckListener}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateChecker}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdatePatch}}
* {{interface|nsIApplicationUpdateService}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateManager}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdatePrompt}}

[[Category:Interfaces]]

nsIUpdatePrompt

new

New page

<breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs>
The <code>nsIUpdatePrompt</code> interface describes an object that can be used to show various update-related notifications to the user.

__TOC__
{{InterfaceStatus|nsIUpdatePrompt|toolkit/mozapps/update/public/nsIUpdateService.idl|unfrozen|Mozilla 1.9|yes}}

Inherits from: {{interface|nsISupports}}

=Method overview=

{| class="standard-table"
|-
| <code>void [[#checkForUpdates()|checkForUpdates]]();</code>
|-
| <code>void [[#showUpdateAvailable()|showUpdateAvailable]](in [[nsIUpdate]] update);</code>
|-
| <code>void [[#showUpdateDownloaded()|showUpdateDownloaded]](in [[nsIUpdate]] update, [optional] in boolean background);</code>
|-
| <code>void [[#showUpdateError()|showUpdateError]](in [[nsIUpdate]] update);</code>
|-
| <code>void [[#showUpdateHistory()|showUpdateHistory]](in [[nsIDOMWindow]] parent);</code>
|-
| <code>void [[#showUpdateInstalled()|showUpdateInstalled]](in [[nsIUpdate]] update);</code>
|-
|}

=Methods=

==checkForUpdates()==
Presents a user interface that checks for and displays the available updates.

void checkForUpdates();

<h5>Parameters</h5>

None.

==showUpdateAvailable()==
Shows a message advising the user that an update is available to be downloaded and installed.

void showUpdateAvailable(
in nsIUpdate update
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>

;<tt>update</tt>
:An {{interface|nsIUpdate}} describing the update that's available.

==showUpdateDownloaded()==
Shows a message advising the user that an update has been downloaded, and that the user should restart the application in order to install it.

void showUpdateDownloaded(
in nsIUpdate update,
[optional] in boolean background
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>
;<tt>update</tt>
:An {{interface|nsIUpdate}} describing the update that was downloaded.
;<tt>background</tt>
:An optional parameter that, if provided and <code>true</code>, presents a less-obtrusive, non-modal notification alert.

==showUpdateError()==
Displays an error message telling the user about an update failure, such as a failure to successfully apply a patch.

void showUpdateError(
in nsIUpdate update
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>
;<tt>update</tt>
:An {{interface|nsIUpdate}} describing the update that failed to install.

==showUpdateHistory()==
Shows a list of all updates that have been installed to date.

void showUpdateHistory(
in nsIDOMWindow parent
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>

;<tt>parent</tt>
:An {{interface|nsIDOMWindow}} indicating the parent window to which to anchor the update list window. This can be <code>null</code>.

==showUpdateInstalled()==
Shows a message detailing the update that was just installed.

void showUpdateInstalled(
in nsIUpdate update
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>

;<tt>update</tt>
:An {{interface|nsIUpdate}} describing the update that was installed.

=See also=

* {{interface|nsIUpdate}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateCheckListener}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateChecker}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdatePatch}}
* {{interface|nsIApplicationUpdateService}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateManager}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateTimerManager}}

[[Category:Interfaces]]

nsIApplicationUpdateService

new

New page

<breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs>
The <code>nsIApplicationUpdateService</code> interface describes a global application service that handles performing background update checks. It also provides utilities for selecting and downloading update patches.

__TOC__
{{InterfaceStatus|nsIApplicationUpdateService|toolkit/mozapps/update/public/nsIUpdateService.idl|unfrozen|Mozilla 1.9|yes}}

Inherits from: {{interface|nsISupports}}

=Method overview=

{| class="standard-table"
|-
| <code>void [[#addDownloadListener()|addDownloadListener]](in [[nsIRequestObserver]] listener);</code>
|-
| <code>[[AString]] [[#downloadUpdate()|downloadUpdate]](in [[nsIUpdate]] update, in boolean background]] listener);</code>
|-
| <code>void [[#pauseDownload()|pauseDownload]]();</code>
|-
| <code>void [[#removeDownloadListener()|removeDownloadListener]](in [[nsIRequestObserver]] listener);</code>
|-
| <code>[[nsIUpdate]] [[#selectUpdate()|selectUpdate]]([array, size_is(updateCount)] in nsIUpdate updates, in unsigned long updateCount);</code>
|-
|}

=Attributes=

{| class="standard-table"
|-
| class="header"|Attribute
| class="header"|Type
| class="header"|Description
|-
|-
|<code>backgroundChecker</code>
|<code>[[nsIUpdateChecker]]</code>
|The update checker being used for background update checking; '''read only'''.
|-
|<code>isDownloading</code>
|<code>boolean</code>
|<code>true</code> if a download is in progress, otherwise <code>false</code>. '''Read only'''.
|-
|<code>canUpdate</code>
|<code>boolean</code>
|<code>true</code> if the update service is able to download and install updates. This depends on whether or not the current user has the necessary access privileges for the install directory.
|-
|}

=Methods=

==addDownloadListener()==
Adds a listener that receives progress and state information about the update that is currently being downloaded. This information is most commonly used to update a user interface that informs the user as to the status of an update.

void addDownloadListener(
in nsIRequestObserver listener
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>

;<tt>listener</tt>
:An object implementing {{interface|nsIRequestObserver}} and optionally {{interface|nsIProgressEventSink}} that will be notified of state and progress information as the update is downloaded.

==downloadUpdate()==
Starts downloading a software update.

AString downloadUpdate(
in nsIUpdate update,
in boolean background
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>

;<tt>update</tt>
:An {{interface|nsIUpdate}} object indicating the update to download.
;<tt>background</tt>
:<code>true</code> to download the update in the background or <code>false</code> to download it in the foreground.

<h5>Return value</h5>

A string indicating the status of the update upon return:

;"downloading"
:The update is being downloaded.
;"pending"
:The update is ready to be applied.
;"applying"
:The update is in the process of being applied.
;"succeeded"
:The update has been installed successfully.
;"download-failed"
:The update failed to be downloaded.
;"failed"
:Installing the update failed.

==pauseDownload()==
Pauses the currently active update download.

void pauseDownload();

<h5>Parameters</h5>

None.

==selectUpdate()==
Selects the best update to install from a provided list of available updates.

nsIUpdate selectUpdate(
[array, size_is(updateCount)] in nsIUpdate updates,
in unsigned long updateCount
);

<h5>Parameters</h5>

;<tt>updates</tt>
:An array of updates that are available to install.
;<tt>updateCount</tt>
:The number of updates in the <tt>updates</tt> array.

<h5>Return value</h5>

An {{interface|nsIUpdate}} object indicating the most appropriate update to install.

=See also=

* {{interface|nsIUpdate}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateCheckListener}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateChecker}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdatePatch}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateManager}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdatePrompt}}
* {{interface|nsIUpdateTimerManager}}

[[Category:Interfaces]]

nsIUpdateCheckListener

←Older revision Revision as of 18:34, 19 March 2008 Line 1: Line 1: <breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs> <breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs> -{{fx_minversion_header|3}}  The <code>nsIUpdateCheckListener</code> interface describes an object that listens to the progress of an update check operation. The object is notified as the check continues, finishes, or in case of an error. The <code>nsIUpdateCheckListener</code> interface describes an object that listens to the progress of an update check operation. The object is notified as the check continues, finishes, or in case of an error.

nsIUpdate

←Older revision Revision as of 18:34, 19 March 2008 Line 1: Line 1: <breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs> <breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs> -{{fx_minversion_header|3}}  The <code>nsIUpdate</code> interface describes an object representing an available update to the current application. This update may have several available patchyes from which one must be selected to download and install. The <code>nsIUpdate</code> interface describes an object representing an available update to the current application. This update may have several available patchyes from which one must be selected to download and install.

nsIUpdatePatch

←Older revision Revision as of 18:34, 19 March 2008 Line 1: Line 1: <breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs> <breadcrumbs></breadcrumbs> -{{fx_minversion_header|3}}  The <code>nsIUpdatePatch</code> interface describes an object representing a patch file that can be downloaded and applied to a version of the application for the purpose of updating it. The <code>nsIUpdatePatch</code> interface describes an object representing a patch file that can be downloaded and applied to a version of the application for the purpose of updating it.

AJAX:Other Resources

←Older revision Revision as of 18:33, 19 March 2008 Line 3: Line 3: == All Other Resources == == All Other Resources == -* '''[http://www.ajaxlines.com/ AJAX Lines]'''  * [http://www.ajaxreview.com/ AJAX Review] * [http://www.ajaxreview.com/ AJAX Review] * [http://www.maxkiesler.com/index.php/mhub/ mHub : Ajax and rails examples & how-to's] * [http://www.maxkiesler.com/index.php/mhub/ mHub : Ajax and rails examples & how-to's] Line 13: Line 12: * [http://www.ajaxpatterns.org/Main_Page AJAX Patterns] * [http://www.ajaxpatterns.org/Main_Page AJAX Patterns] * [http://www.ajaxtoday.com AJAX Today Your ajax tutorials, articles, patterns, blogs] * [http://www.ajaxtoday.com AJAX Today Your ajax tutorials, articles, patterns, blogs]  +* [http://www.ajaxlines.com/ AJAX Lines] * [http://ajaxial.com/ AJAXIAL - a Web 2.0 and Ajax directory] * [http://ajaxial.com/ AJAXIAL - a Web 2.0 and Ajax directory]

Comment on My Mahalo Released: Crowd Sourcing Gets a Little More Social by Facey Spacey Development

What Mahalo needs to do is make a friggin Mashup with Facebook. Facebook can easily come outside of Facebook itself now and exist on your own site. You just need to redirect your users to the Facebook login and back to see content pulled from the Facebook API.

I don’t know why nobody hasn’t made a Google Ajax Search API and Facebook API mashup yet either!!!

Anyone, interested? I have some fantastic ideas to accomplish a Mahalo-killer quick with the too.

James
from
FaceySpacey.com - “The Startup Incubator”

Click to play this video.

The Parasocial Phenomena

Parasocial: something beyond social norm. From Latin where para can have the meaning ‘beyond normal’. One example of this phenomenon is that someone who watches a soap opera over a period of time creates an illusion that s/he has a relationship to the television persona. These relationships can significantly influence and change people’s lives. This is generally perceived as an unconscious event, as the subject does not realize what is happening.*

It’s kind of fun being a micro nano B-List celebrity, especially if you don’t take it seriously. Social TNT Author Chris Lynn and I had fun with this at the Love 2.0 Engage web 2.0 party on Monday (see this 20 second video).

Yet, attendance at Web 2.0 parties this week in Silicon Valley and SNCR’s NewComm Forum reminded me of how strange this cultural phenomena is becoming in social worlds. Watching other relatively to extremely well known bloggers and executives get worshipped, hit on, and in some cases mocked and/or stalked, gives one reason to pause.

Social media lowers the bar for stardom, at lease within microcommunities. And as a result, people that may naturally be inclined towards becoming groupies, stalkers and trolls find themselves empowered. Identities are stolen, attacks occur, and mayhem ensues.

Perhaps the most hilarious of these was this week’s hijacking of Shel Israel’s Owl named Hoot on Twitter. This comes after the whole (and pathetically continuing) puppet thing from Loren Feldman. The plastic bird’s fowl representation really shows the hilarious and absolutely silly nature of social media “stardom.”

There is no worse example of the absolute pathetic nature of parasocial than Valleywag a shameless virtual tabloid that chronicles the rise and fall of Silicon Valley rock stars. Having spent some significant time in Silicon Valley since the book was published, it’s easy to see how this rag serves a certain part of the population, both locally and from afar.

Living in a town where the Washingtonienne (a.ka. Jessica Cutler) and the Monica Lewinsky-inspired impeachment happened, where scandal rocks national and global governance, this seems so… Little League. At the same time, it’s very real and needs to be taken seriously.

In a fractured media environment, a certain percentage of the population in any micro-community will become parasocially attached to A, B and C-list stars in an unhealthy manner. It’s best to accept it, and start talking about what to do, if anything.

Some may say, “That’s the price you pay for fame and success.” This made sense to me when millions of dollars were being doled out to athletes and Hollywood stars. But most bloggers and social media successes don’t make more money.

So should we really tolerate parasocial behavior just because someone has a achieved a little nano success? Conversely, is it simply a part of the human condition? Or do we just love a success, and some take it way too far?

Sidenote: I actually saw Feldman at a party this past weekend, and at the behest of several friends, decided to put aside my original feelings expressed here and other places and say hello and a possible handshake. This was promptly dismissed with a snarl.

I’m not sure if this Tweet was a response, but it really doesn’t matter. Principles must supersede personalities. While I still strongly and openly disagree with Feldman’s continuing and unnecessary attacking of Shel Israel, civility matters more in the big picture.

* American Psychological Association (APA): Parasocial. (n.d.). Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved April 24, 2008, from Reference.com website: http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Parasocial

Secretary's Remarks: Remarks at the Higher Education Summit for Global Development

Remarks at the Higher Education Summit for Global Development

Secretary Condoleezza Rice
Loy Henderson Auditorium
Washington, DC
April 30, 2008

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. First of all, I apologize for being just a little bit late, but since I’m in a room of fellow educators, I think you’ll understand. I went down to the Marshall Wing to talk to a group of young people from the Middle East who are here on fellowships and internships. They are young democracy advocates and activists from Egypt and Iraq and Jordan and Lebanon and Yemen. And we got into a rather intensive dialogue about change and how to bring it about and I’m afraid I lost track of time.

So, thank you very much for allowing me to come and thank you, Henrietta, for pinch-hitting until I could get here. I’d like to thank Henrietta for the introduction that she’s just given me, which I’m sure was a perfectly nice introduction even though I didn’t really hear it. (Laughter.) Was it a good one? Good, thank you.

And I’d like to thank the staffs of USAID and the Education Department for this great event. And I want to acknowledge, especially, my good friend and my cabinet colleague, Margaret Spellings. We started this process together and she has been stalwart in making certain that we pushed it ahead. She’s a terrific Education Secretary. She is a terrific spokesperson for the importance of education. I have always valued her insight and her wise counsel. But most especially, I value her friendship.

Thanks to all of you who have come. You’re an impressive group of people and I’m especially grateful that you took the time out to come and visit. As you know, I was formerly Provost of Stanford and I know that this is a time of year that can be pretty busy as you’re starting to move toward the end of a semester or the end of a quarter. So, I am especially grateful that you took the time to be with us. I want to thank you for your commitment and for the support of our efforts to expand the role of higher education institutions in worldwide economic and social development.

This conference really highlights the potential that we hold when we join forces together: the public sector, the private sector, and, in our case, higher education leaders from around the globe. I see a lot of participants from foreign institutions and I want to thank you for being here. As you know, education is essential to developing human and institutional capacity, that capacity that is so essential to effectively address the most pressing development challenges facing countries around the world. And I want to assure you that America is fully committed to working with you in the months ahead to come to meet the needs of your citizens.

I’d also like to applaud the U.S. corporations, foundations, and higher education institutions that have been active in this effort. Your commitment to working with partners around the globe will bear results of improved education and health care, reduced poverty, better governance practices, and economic growth. The work that you do together has the potential to affect millions for years to come.

Each of your institutions has an important role to play in the future of the world’s youth, particularly in countries where young people are searching for alternatives to the lure of violent extremism. Together, we can unleash a combined power to counter the purveyors of hate, to give young people hope, and to lift up impoverished communities around the globe.

I want to assure each of you that the United States Government, and I in particular, and Margaret, will be your partners in advancing education. Education is the key that gives people around the globe access to unprecedented opportunities of the global economy. Indeed, for this reason, and for many others, I believe that education is not just an issue of education. It is, in fact, a national security issue for all countries in today’s world. And the American Government and the American people will help you to meet them.

Consider this. Globally, United States funding for basic education programs has risen from $100 million in 2000 to $694 million across the globe this fiscal year. This investment is enabling boys and girls in most developing countries to get an education, especially those who are on the margins of society: the poor, the disadvantaged, minorities, and indigenous peoples with historics -- histories of discrimination. In Africa, President Bush has launched two initiatives: The Africa Education Initiative and the Initiative to Expand Education. Funding for these is being used to promote the delivery of and access to quality education for millions more children, youth, and adults. The programs reflect this Administration’s belief that a quality education is vital to so many other hopes that we hold for children around the world, whether it is good health or civic participation or economic opportunity.

One country that particularly highlights the enormous potential of education is Afghanistan, and I know that we have a number of presidents of Afghan universities here today. In 2001, girls were prohibited from attending school. Today, there are more than 1.5 million girls enrolled in school. Literacy is improving. Health care rates are getting better. And at the same time, today, Afghanistan is now the fastest growing economy in South Asia. In fact, Afghanistan’s per capita annual income has nearly doubled in recent years.

We all know that the better educated you are, the better you are likely to do in terms of economic progression and in terms of economic well-being. We know, too, that education is the foundation for better things in life. But I’d like to suggest to you that we spend just a moment setting aside this rather instrumental view of education and why it's important. Of course, we want our kids to be able to get a good job and to have families and to provide for them, but don't we want more for them? Don't we want them to be able to take advantage of the truly transformative nature of education?

You see, I’ve never believed that education was just a way to get a job. Education is really a way to remake yourself. Education is a way to have no limits on your horizons. Education is a way, in a sense, to be born anew. Education is a way to completely and totally become who you should be, who you want to be, who you ought to be, not who you currently are. It opens the mind. It opens the heart. It opens the horizons. A quality education, then, is at the core of what it is to become fully and completely a human being reaching his or her full potential.

I have learned this in my own life many times. I was fortunate to be the child of educators. My parents were teachers. But my grandfather was a man who was a sharecropper’s son. And somehow, he decided he wanted to get book learning. And he went off to little Stillman College to get book learning from his home in Ewtah, Alabama – E-w-t-a-h, Alabama. (Laughter.) And Granddaddy Rice kept asking, in what was the parlance of the day, how a colored man could go to college.

And so they told him about Stillman and he went off and he sold cotton that he himself had raised to be able to go to college. And after his first year, they said, all right, how are you going to pay for your second year? And he said, well, I don’t have any more cotton. And they said, then you’ll have to leave. And he said, well, how are those boys going to college? And they said, well, they have what’s called a scholarship and if you wanted to be a Presbyterian minister, then you could have a scholarship too. (Laughter.) And Granddaddy Rice said, “That’s exactly what I had in mind.” (Laughter.) And my family has been Presbyterian and college-educated ever since. (Laughter.)

I never knew my grandfather, but the stories about him were incredible. He died two months before I was born, but his legacy was one that I dearly appreciate. His daughter would go on to be a Ph.D. in Victorian Literature -- (Applause.) -- his son, my father, the Associate Vice Chancellor of the University of Denver. And one story that was told to me has special meaning. Apparently, during the Great Depression, Granddaddy Rice came home one day and he had with him nine brand new leather-bound books. And my grandmother said to him, where did you get those? And he said, I bought them. And she said, how much did you pay for them? He said $90. Imagine $90 in the Great Depression. And they were the works of Dumas and the works of Shakespeare and the works of Victor Hugo.

And my grandmother was furious knowing that there was much more that could have been done with $90. My grandfather said, well, we can pay for them month to month. That didn’t help. But those books said something about my grandfather’s horizons: this sharecropper’s son who wanted to remake himself through learning. And one of the proudest days of my life was when I got my own Ph.D. and my father gave me the surviving seven leather-bound books.

Those stories I tell you because they perhaps speak to why a black girl from Birmingham, Alabama eventually ended up as Secretary of State. And it speaks to why what you are doing across the world, in partnership with us and in partnership with your people, speaks not just to what job you will hold, not just to what benefits you will gain, but truly who you will become. And that is the greatest gift that anyone could possibly give the children of the world. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

2008/342

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Press Releases: United States Imposes Import Restrictions to Protect the Cultural Heritage of Iraq

Media Note
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
April 30, 2008

United States Imposes Import Restrictions to Protect the Cultural Heritage of Iraq

The Department of State is pleased to announce that pursuant to statutory and Presidential delegated authorities, an import restriction has been imposed by the Department of Homeland Security on cultural heritage material from the Republic of Iraq. The restriction becomes effective today, April 30, 2008, upon publication in the Federal Register of the Designated List of restricted categories of material.

The import restriction is imposed under the Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004, which confers upon the President the authority to make emergency determinations under the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act with respect to any archaeological and ethnological material of Iraq. Acting under Presidential delegated authority, the Department made the necessary statutory determinations including that the subject material is a part of the remains of a particular culture or civilization, the record of which is in jeopardy from pillage, dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation that is, or threatens to be, of crisis proportions. The depredation to the national patrimony of Iraq due to pillage and the unauthorized export of that country’s cultural property has been extensively documented.

The import restriction applies to any cultural property of Iraq, including objects of ceramic, stone, metal, glass, ivory, bone, shell, stucco, painting, textile, paper, parchment, leather, wood, and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, or religious importance illegally removed from Iraq since the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 on August 6, 1990. Such material may not be imported unless accompanied by documentation that it was exported from Iraq prior to that date. The Designated List can be found at http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop.

Agriculture, cities, writing, temples, trade, warfare, the state, empire, libraries, art, and science all developed and flourished throughout Iraq’s rich succession of ancient and Islamic cultures. Iraq’s archaeological and heritage sites are the archive of this unique history, the study of which, despite generations of scholarship, has only begun. The U.S. import restriction is intended to reduce the incentive for pillage in order to better preserve Iraq’s cultural heritage for present and future generations.

2008/340

Released on April 30, 2008

  

Press Releases: Release of the Country Reports on Terrorism 2007

Release of the Country Reports on Terrorism 2007

Dell L. Dailey, Coordinator of the Office for Counterterrorism
Russ Travers, Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; Gonzo Gallegos, Director, Office of Press Relations
Washington, DC
April 30, 2008

MR. GALLEGOS: Good morning, everybody. I appreciate your attendance. Today we have the Coordinator for the Office for Counterterrorism Dell L. Dailey, and the Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Russ Travers. First, Mr. Dailey will be doing a brief presentation. Mr. Travers will follow. And then after that, we'll be open for questions from you all. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Good morning. Thank you for attending this briefing. Besides meeting Congressional requirements, the 2007 edition of the Country Reports on Terrorism aims to inform, to stimulate constructive debate, and to enhance our collective understanding of the international terrorist threat. The Country Reports should serve as a reference tool to inform policymakers, the American public, and our international partners about our efforts, progress and challenges in the war on terror.

The 2007 Report begins with a strategic overview to illustrate trends. We note some positives. First, working with allies and partners across the world, we created a less permissive operating environment for terrorists, kept leaders on the move or in hiding, and degraded their ability to plan and mount attacks. Dozens of countries have passed new legislation or strengthened preexisting laws that provide law enforcement and judicial authorities with new tools to bring terrorists to justice.

We saw several 2007 plots disrupted in Europe that could have resulted in serious loss of life. In June, terrorists attempted attacks in London, and a day later, terrorists drove a burning car into the Glasgow Airport. A total of 70 individuals, including two suspected perpetrators in Glasgow, were arrested in connection with these attacks. In Germany, a major terrorist plot was disrupted in September with the arrest of two ethnic Germans and a Turkish citizen resident. The plotters, who German officials said were connected to the Islamic Jihad Group, had acquired large amounts of hydrogen peroxide for possible use in multiple car attacks.

Also in September, Danish police arrested eight alleged militant Islamists in Copenhagen with al-Qaida links on suspicion of their preparing explosives for use in a terrorist attack. In Southeast Asia, there have been no new major Jemaah Islamiya attacks in the region in over a year. In January 2007, we confirmed that the Abu Sayyaf Group's nominal leader, Khadaffy Janjalani, was killed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as was the Abu Sayyaf Group's spokesperson Abu Solaiman.

Indonesian police broke up the Jemaah Islamiya cells in Sulawesi and in Central Java. The Iraqi Government, in coordination with coalition forces, made significant progress in combating al-Qaida in Iraq, AQI, and affiliated terrorist organizations. The Baghdad Security Plan initiated in February with assistance from local citizens, has succeeded in reducing violence to late 2005 levels. It has disrupted and diminished AQI infrastructure, and driven some surviving AQI fighters from Baghdad and the Al Anbar province into northern Iraqi provinces. While AQI remained a threat, there was a noticeable reduction in the number of security incidents throughout much of Iraq, including the decrease in civilian casualties, enemy attacks, and improvised explosive device attacks in the last quarter of the year.

In Colombia, the Uribe administration worked to defeat and demobilize Colombia's terrorist groups through its powerful democratic security policy, which combines military, intelligence and police operations, efforts to demobilize combatants, and the provision of public services in rural areas. While the FARC continued to operate and control territory mostly in the more remote areas of the country, its capabilities have been reduced.

Mauritania's successful transition to a democratic governance in 2007 represented a significant victory for counterterrorism efforts in West Africa and an important victory against efforts to weaken governance and impose radical ideology on a traditionally moderate population. Mauritania took strong stands in the face of multiple attacks from al-Qaida in the -- from al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, called AQIM, in 2007, working with regional partners to apprehend terrorists and improving its capacity to defeat terrorists and efforts to use its territory to launch attacks and establish terrorist safe havens.

Challenges remain, however. Despite the efforts of both Afghan and Pakistani security forces, instability, coupled with Islamabad-brokered ceasefire agreement in effect for the first half of 2007 along the Pakistani border, provide al-Qaida leadership with the ability to conduct training and operational planning, particularly that targeting Western Europe and U.S. -- and the United States. Numerous senior AQ operatives were captured or killed, but AQ leaders continued to plot attacks and cultivate stronger operational connections that radiate outward from Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.

Al-Qaida. Core elements of al-Qaida are adaptable and resilient, and al-Qaida and its associated networks remain our greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its partners. By making use of local cells, terrorists have been able to sidestep many of our border and transportation security measures. During the reporting period, terrorist attacks around the world, which include incidents in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen resulted in more than 3,200 noncombatant deaths, 6,000 injured, and 300 kidnapped. The importance of these numbers is that they were mostly Muslims.

AQ's increase in its propaganda efforts seeking to "inspire" support in Muslim populations undermine Western confidence and create a perception of a worldwide movement more powerful than it actually is. Terrorists consider information operations a principal part of their effort. Use of the internet for propaganda, recruiting, fundraising, and increasingly, for training, has made the internet a "virtual safe haven."

2007 was marked with the affiliation of regional insurgent groups with al-Qaida. We note, in particular, the growing threat in North Africa posed by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, which was known as a Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC, prior to its September '06 merger with al-Qaida. April '07, AQIM launched suicide attacks for the first time and vowed to use them as a primary tactic against their enemies. The near-simultaneous December 11 bombings of the Algerian Constitutional Council and the UN headquarters in Algiers underline a substantial shift in strategy. The attack on UN headquarters underline that AQIM now considers foreign interests to be attractive targets.

We note that AQIM's consistently changing profile through 2007. For example, the August 8 suicide bomber was a 15-year-old boy, the youngest suicide bomber in the history of Algeria, while a suicide bomber who struck the UN headquarters on December 11^th was a 64-year-old man in the advanced stages of cancer, potentially the oldest.

Counter-radicalization is a key policy priority for the United States, particularly in Europe, given the potential for Europe-based violent extremism to threaten our European partners and the United States. The leaders of al-Qaida and its affiliates are extremely interested in recruiting terrorists from and deploying terrorists to Europe, people familiar with our Western cultures that can travel freely.

AQ exploits the frustration of many Muslims around the world whose grievances are often legitimate. Terrorists seek to convert alienated or aggrieved populations by stages to increasingly radicalize and provide the extremist viewpoints, turning them into sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, in some cases, members of terrorist networks. In some regions, this includes efforts by AQ and other terrorists to exploit insurgency and communal conflict as radicalization and recruitment tools to their benefit and using the internet to convey their message.

Countering radicalization demands that we treat immigrant and youth populations not as a source of threat to be defended against, but as a target of enemy subversion to be protected and supported. It requires community leaders to take responsibility for actions of members within their communities and to counteract extremist propaganda and subversion. The terrorist message of hate and death holds no promise for anyone's future.

State sponsors of terrorism. The report features a chapter on state sponsors of terrorism, which include Iran, Syria, Sudan, Cuba, and North Korea. What causes the greatest concern about our state sponsorship is a state sponsor that directs WMD resources to the terrorists or one that which enables resources to be clandestinely diverted. This may pose a potentially grave WMD terrorist threat.

It will come as no surprise to hear that Iran remained the most significant state sponsor of terrorism. Iran provides aid to Palestinian terrorist groups, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq-based militants, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Despite its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, Iranian authorities continue to provide lethal support, including weapons, training, funding and guidance, to some Iraqi militant groups that target coalition and Iraqi security forces and Iraqi civilians. In this way, Iranian Government forces have been responsible for attacks on coalition forces.

Since 2006, Iran has arranged a number of shipments of small arms and associated ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107-millimeter rockets, and plastic explosives, possibly including man-portable air defense systems, MANPADs, to the Taliban.

Syria, another state sponsor of terrorism, both directly and in coordination with Iran and Hezbollah, continued to undermine the elected Government of Lebanon and remained a serious security threat. Foreign terrorists continue to transit Syria en route to and from Iraq. Despite acknowledged reductions in foreign fighter flow, the scope of the problem remained large. According to the December Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq Report to Congress, nearly 90 percent of all foreign terrorists known to be in Iraq have used Syria as an entry point. The Syrian Government could do more to stop known terror networks and foreign fighter facilitations from operating within its borders.

Terrorist safe havens and the concept, regional strategic initiative. The Report also includes a discussion of terrorist safe havens. We consider the terrorist safe haven to be ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to the U.S. national security interest are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will or both. This varies slightly from the intelligence community use of the term because we include the consideration of political will in capacity of host countries.

Remote areas of the Sahel and Maghreb regions in Africa serve as terrorist safe havens because of little government control in sparsely populated regions. Portions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA, in the northwest province area of Pakistan have become a safe haven for al-Qaida terrorists, Afghan insurgents, and other extremists. Southeast Asia includes a safe haven composed of the Sulawesi Sea and Sula Archipelago, which sit astride the maritime boundary between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. A number of al-Qaida operatives remain in East Africa, particularly Somalia, where they pose a serious threat to the United States and allied interests in the region. Although these elements have been somewhat disrupted as a result of Ethiopian and Somalian Transitional Federal Government military actions, they continue to operate in Somalia and elsewhere in East Africa.

Since 2006, we’ve been working on the Regional Strategic Initiative, or RSI, in an effort to develop flexible regional networks. We work with our Ambassadors and interagency representatives in key transit areas of operation to assist the – to identify the threat and to devise collaborative strategies, action plans, and policy recommendations. The RSI teams use all tools of statecraft in this effort.

Our toolkit to counterterrorism includes the Antiterrorism Assistance Program which provides partner nations and countries with training, equipment and technology needed to increase their capabilities to find and arrest terrorists, the designation of terrorist organizations, and individuals in an effort to block terrorist funding, and also counterterrorist finance training. A key component of our efforts to address the conditions that terrorists exploit for recruitment and ideological purposes are the USG assistance programs administered through USAID, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other U.S. entities, which increase access to education, improve health care, and focus on democratic and economic reform. All these tools and more are explained, in detail, in Chapter 5.

Regional overviews and country reports. You’ll find in the Report, as in past years, regional overviews and reports on the terrorist situation in individual countries. We note progress and lack of progress where appropriate. Examples include: Afghanistan remained threatened by Taliban and other insurgent groups and criminal gangs, some of whom who are linked to al-Qaida and terrorist sponsorship outside the country. Taliban insurgents murdered local leaders and attacked Pakistani Government outposts in the FATA. Nonetheless, the Government of Afghanistan continued to strengthen its national institutions, and polls indicated the majority of Afghans believe that they are better off now than they were under the Taliban.

The Government of Saudi Arabia confronted terrorism and extremist ideologies with varying degrees of success. The country suffered two high-profile terrorist incidents: the shooting of four French citizens and the violent murder of a high-ranking Saudi general -- excuse me, colonel. Saudi officials acknowledge that the long-term solution must include an effective campaign to delegitimize the extremist ideology that underpins support of the terrorism. The government continued its extensive prisoner rehabilitation program aimed at undermining detainees’ adherence to extremist ideology. More than a thousand Saudis have completed this program. The U.S. Government is following the progress of the program closely to both understand it and to monitor rates of recidivism.

In Lebanon, a campaign of domestic political violence continued. Most notable were the June 13, September 19 and September 12 car-bombing assassinations of Walid Eido, Antoine Ghanem and General Francois al-Haj, respectively.

In May 2007, Venezuela was recertified as not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts under Section 40-alpha of the Arms Export and Control Act.

Despite U.S. pressure, Yemen continued to implement a surrender program with lenient requirements for terrorists it concluded it could not apprehend using traditional law enforcement means. The Yemeni justice system was also less effective. The courts did not set dates for trials of suspects involved in the two September ’06 al-Qaida-orchestrated attacks on oil facilities in eastern Yemen. Finally, they released, pending their appeals, several subjects wanted by the United States for acts of terrorism.

Let me summarize, first of all, that we will not prevail against terrorism without embracing a holistic approach such as that employed by the Regional Strategic Initiative. Over time, our global and regional cooperative efforts will reduce terrorists’ capacity to harm us and our partners, while local security and development assistance will build up partners’ capacity. If we are to be successful, we must work together with our growing networks of partners towards our common goal in a strategic and coordinated manner to overwhelmingly defeat this terrorist compelling challenge.

Thank you for the opportunity to share our ideas and thoughts with you. I’ll take questions after Russ Travers has had a chance to talk about methodology and the numbers. Thank you.

MR. TRAVERS: Thanks, Dell. Good morning. One of the responsibilities of the National Counterterrorism Center is to compile and maintain a database of terrorist incidents. We then draw from that database and support the Country Reports. And what I’m going to do is give you a very high-level overview. The -- all of the briefing boards are being distributed to you now.

I would encourage you to take a look at the NCTC.gov website. It provides the methodology we use. It actually has all of the incidents, the 14,000 or so, that are out there, as well as charts and graphs and background material in an effort to be as transparent as possible.

A quick word about methodology. Several years ago, we shifted away from the methodology you see on the left-hand side for international terrorism. Our judgment was that that was simply too narrow. You can see an underlying phrase there that talks about the requirement for individuals from two or more countries to be involved. That led to excluding events that, in our view, were clearly terrorism. And so we shifted about three and a half years ago to using that much broader statutory definition of terrorism. Three components: It has to be premeditated, politically motivated, directed against noncombatants. That is an incredibly broad definition.

The upshot has been that we’ve moved from counting several hundred incidents each year to well in excess of 10,000. And we have used that for the last three years, and that allows for year-to-year comparability.

Here you see that the global aggregates for 2005, ‘6 and ‘7. If you look from 2006 to 2007, we are essentially flat in terms of the number of incidents; fatalities are up; total victims -- fatalities, injuries and hostages -- are actually down. Really, the important point of the two bullets are down at the bottom. There is no question that tracking trends, cataloging this data, can be invaluable for a whole host of issues associated with the analysis of terrorism, but that second point is critical. In an aggregate count, we’re talking about different groups with different agendas, and as a result, our view, I think academics’ view, is that the aggregate totals are simply not a particularly useful metric for measuring success in the war on terror. You really have to disaggregate, so that’s what we’ll do now is we’ll peel it back a little bit.

Here you see a region-by-region breakout. I guess three points that you should take away from here. First, terrorism is a tactic. It’s used by different groups all over the world. Second point, the vast majority of attacks in 2007, as has been the case in previous years, are found in the Near East and South Asia. Essentially, 80 percent of the global attacks were in Near East and South Asia last year.

At a global level, as I mentioned, the incidents are essentially unchanged. You do see a growth, lower left-hand corner, in Africa. That was almost entirely in Somalia. And you do see a growth in East Asia. That was almost entirely as a result of the insurgency in Thailand. You do see slight declines in all the other regions of the world.

Disaggregated a little bit further, and look -- focus specifically on Iraq. As in previous years, roughly half of the global attacks, roughly 60 percent of the total fatalities, occurred in Iraq. The upper left-hand chart gives you total attacks and total fatalities over the last three years. You may recall from last year that there was a substantial jump from ’05 to ’06; ’06 to ’07 relatively constant; but here again, aggregate numbers don’t really tell the story. You have to look at that graph in the lower right-hand side, and what you see is -- you saw a precipitous decline in attacks and fatalities over the course of the year, so sort of a quarter-by-quarter analysis.

And here’s the rest of the world with Iraq numbers backed out of the equation, and what you see is kind of mixed picture. On the good news front, as Ambassador Dailey indicated, there’s been a substantial decline in FARC attacks in Colombia, roughly 50 percent over the course of the year. In the Middle East, we saw very few attacks in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, in Egypt. I believe we cataloged one event in Saudi Arabia for all of last year. And there were also declines in India, Indonesia and the Philippines.

On the less favorable side, we saw approximately a 50 percent increase in Thailand and we saw a 100 percent increase in Pakistan. There were also more attacks in both Afghanistan and Somalia. And as you can see, in Africa, there was a growth in lethality of attacks. I would highlight Algeria in particular, in which after the merger, attacks actually declined; however, the number of fatalities increased substantially as a result of the AQIM. On net, a growth in attacks and fatalities in the rest of the world.

And the last briefing board, just a word about the attacks and the toll associated with them. I mentioned increased lethality. Algeria was one case. Pakistan is another. As I said, the number of attacks in Pakistan basically doubled, the number of fatalities essentially quadrupled, primarily in northwestern parts.

Part of that has to do with that upper left-hand graph. Suicide attacks around the world were up about 50 percent from ’06 to ’07. And we also see, as you can see in the lower right-hand side, a growth in the number of attacks in which more than ten or more people were killed. That was also up.

A word about the human toll. Beyond the gross numbers, as in previous years, police officers were hit particularly hard. Last year, almost 9,400 police officers were injured or killed. We also saw a growth in the number of attacks in schools, and many of them against girls’ schools by Islamic extremists: 300 attacks, killing or wounding 180 teachers and almost 800 students. We also have reporting indicating upwards of 2,400 children were killed. The number is undoubtedly far higher, but that’s what we can document.

You got recent al-Qaida leadership statements that they don’t kill or attack civilians. We drew only on al-Qaida-affiliated claimed attacks, and we find that those attacks killed our wounded something like 5,400 civilians at markets, at funeral processions and so forth. That number also is much higher, but these are only attacks that al-Qaida-affiliated groups claimed responsibility for.

And more generally, Muslims were hit particularly hard. As in previous years, well over 50 percent of the global people killed and wounded were Muslim. And again, mosques also hit hard. Something like a hundred mosques were attacked last year.

That’s a very high-level overview. As I said, all of the supporting data is out there on our NCTC.gov website. And we can answer any questions.

QUESTION: I have a quick clarification.

MR. TRAVERS: Please.

QUESTION: You said that there were 50 percent more attacks in Pakistan this year than last year?

MR. TRAVERS: Attacks doubled in Pakistan from ’06 to ’07, quadrupled in terms of fatalities and injuries.

QUESTION: Is there any change regarding who is behind these attacks in your data?

MR. TRAVERS: I’m sorry, ma’am?

QUESTION: Who is behind these all attacks in your data? Did you mention anything about it?

MR. TRAVERS: If we have reporting, if an organization claims responsibility or -- again, this is all open source data -- if there’s an allegation that an entity is responsible, then we catalog it accordingly in the database. We work a great deal with academics to maintain as pure a dataset as we can, and they have asked us only to include data that we can document.

We will be moving over the course of the next year to allow analyst judgment, but I think for all intents and purposes, probably 70 percent of the attacks in the database do not have a responsible party associated with them.

Sir.

QUESTION: Sir, FATA has been always there and the training camps and terrorism and al-Qaida were always there and they were all getting training and sending terrorism – terrorists from that area. Secondly, FATA has become a subject -- are in the news now. So what are you going to do to flush out all of those training camps and terrorism in the part of Pakistan’s FATA or with the new government, as far as this Report is concerned or beyond?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: The Pakistani new government has made it very clear that they’re going to, as a priority, go after extremism and security. And I think you’ll see in Prime Minister Gillani’s statement in the news today that he reinforces that. He will not take military actions off the – off the table, but he will try peacefully, and the government will try peacefully, through economic development, social development and also the potential for military activity, to try and reunite FATA with the mainstream Pakistanis. We want to let the Pakistani Government do its – the new government to do its best in democracy and good governance.

QUESTION: A quick follow-up – I’m sorry.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Yes, ma’am?

QUESTION: Can I follow up on that issue? Are you afraid that this kind of agreement that the government is forging with the rebels in the area could hamper your – the United States’ counterterrorism efforts in the region, that it might curtail flights, that it might, you know, stop you from doing what you need to do? Because obviously, you had very good cooperation with the Musharraf government, which – and President Musharraf certainly doesn’t seem to have the influence on these issues they way he used to.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: We’ll be working with the Pakistanis and the FATA in this economic and development plan. So, it’s not necessarily a single U.S. effort that’s taking place there. We want to see what they conclude with in that particular agreement. Two areas we would like to see no movement would be a curtailment and stopping of any type of extremist activities inside that area. And the second is, we don’t want them to be able to extend out of Pakistan to Afghanistan, Europe, United States and those areas. So we think that the -- we’re not completely – aware of all aspects of the treaty, but we’d like to make sure those two areas are enforced inside the treaty parameters.

QUESTION: Dell, a couple of – well, one question and a corollary. What do you make of al-Qaida’s resurgence in North Africa, the fact that they’ve established bases so close to Europe now? And of the corollary: Compared to 9/11, is al-Qaida stronger now or weaker?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: We think al-Qaida is weaker now than it was at the 9/11 timeframe. There are a lot of things that have taken place since 9/11. I mentioned in here the countries have implemented counterterrorism legislation. There’s been an international multilateral effort to stem terrorism through the UN and through other multilateral organizations. We think that all of those tools, along with capacity-building, along with awareness that other countries may be vulnerable to some of the al-Qaida extremism themselves. This greater understanding of the threat has allowed a momentum to be developed that allows al-Qaida to be fundamentally disaggregated by its international reach. And now the only thing it can really do international is by its media propaganda. Everything else is regionalized.

And now, I'd take you to the second portion of your question, Charlie. The GSPC was kind of on the down, al-Qaida was on the downswing. They linked up, giving some international flavor to the GSPC, and they have stolen the GSPC’s actions and desires because now they are fulfilling al-Qaida desires. And that’s best evidenced by destroying or blowing the bomb up at the UN headquarters. GSPC hadn’t done that previously. So, we see al-Qaida co-opting its regional partners to its advantage and to, possibly, the disadvantage of the regional partner.

QUESTION: And the fact that they’re close to Europe now, those bases --

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Explain that again.

QUESTION: The fact that the bases in North Africa are geographically closer to Europe now, is that troubling?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Bases anywhere are troubling. The fact that they’re there, and, I would say, in that kind of safe haven environment, we’re not sure if they’re actual hard and fast bases. I think the governments have a pretty good handle on keeping an aggressive manner both militarily and – this was Algeria – militarily and politically to keep them curtailed. This is probably an expectation of some type of outgrowth from the GSPC.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: What’s the country that you see as the – having the highest number of terrorist incidents? And what percentage of your total calculations of the number of incidents take place in Iraq?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Russ?

MR. TRAVERS: We’ve had a chance now to invite each of us to the podium. Total numbers; Iraq undoubtedly constitute the highest numbers both in terms of attacks and fatalities. Other key countries you want? Or what are you looking for?

QUESTION: Could you give us some idea of a percentage of those attacks that take place in Iraq rather than in the rest of the world? I mean, are there more attacks, for example, in Iraq than everywhere else put together? Or is there some kind of number you – or percentage or ideas that --

MR. TRAVERS: We can pull the numbers. I’ll get them for you. Just stop by at the end and I’ll get the exact numbers for you.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Yes, ma’am?

QUESTION: What kind of evidence does the U.S. Government has supporting these claims that there is no custom enforcement at the Venezuelan airport, especially on flights between (inaudible) and Caracas?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: I’m going to have to have Rhonda help you get an answer of that. That’s a bit more technical and a bit more specific than I can respond to right here. We’ll take that and pursue it at a later date.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Thank you. Two questions. First one, how do you evaluate the anti-terrorism situation in China, particularly when the Beijing Olympics is coming? And secondly, how will the United States work with China to secure the Beijing Olympics? What assistance the United State will provide? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: The Chinese have identified and there's been some recent resurgence of the ETIM, East Turkistan Islamic Movement. It has got some potential to affect Pakistan and Afghanistan, so we’re particularly interested in that terrorist threat.

In dealing with regards to the Olympics, we’ll work very closely with China. The – like many other countries, we’ll have our team there. The Chinese are very adamant that they’ll be able to take care of all of the events that take place there. We’re working very closely with them, with our law enforcement individuals out of the Embassy to ensure good communication and good flow of information. We’re pretty comfortable that in the Peking Olympics that the Chinese are confident and have adequate resources to accomplish their mission.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: What about Cuba? Why Cuba is still on this list since there was no act of terrorism for years and years? And the Report mentions the lack of extradition of a terror suspect, but Cuba is not the only country in the world not to extradite. And the others are not on this list.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Cuba has their internal law number 93, which has got some counterterrorism legislation and measures that they don’t implement, that they don’t enforce. They do have over 70 refugees or fugitives, I think, in the – from the United States. But most importantly, they provide safe haven to the FARC, the ETA, and the ELN. That’s why it stayed on the state sponsorship list.

QUESTION: One more, a follow-up?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Yes, ma’am – or, yes, sir.

QUESTION: Can you give us some more information about European region and former Soviet states? It seems the situation quite normal there.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Can I give you – can I give you more information on European --

QUESTION: Yes, more information about the European region and the former Soviet states.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: The European region, as I discussed earlier, has considerable activity in the terrorist region. And they are well suited to handle it, and have shown in the past their intelligence services and their law enforcement and their legislation and their terrorist financing tools are capable of doing that.

Eastern European, maybe not quite as – as mature as we like, but they are capacity-building through programs with the United States and with our embassies. And they have a positive attitude to not let themselves become either a safe haven or a target for terrorism.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: Yeah, on the – it’s a follow-up and also on the Western Hemisphere. Do you see any change or do you forecast any change because of all the political changes in the last year in the Western Hemisphere? And also, do you see any difference in the – Cuba’s behavior after the change in government there?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: We’ll take the second one first. There’s been no change in the terrorism – counterterrorism aspect of Cuba since the change of government. With regards to the Western Hemisphere, it is a – because of people who have perceived and real grievances, it could potentially become a target area for terrorist organizations to use. We have not seen – let me rephrase that -- I think there is anecdotal information of individuals coming from Europe or Middle East through and into the Western Hemisphere, but not all the way up to the United States in a trafficking mode.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Ambassador Dailey, I want to ask you a question about Saudi Arabia. The Report seems fairly pointedly worded when it comes to Saudi Arabia. You mentioned that they had some mixed successes. But can you reconcile that with comments from top Administration officials such as Stuart Levey at the Treasury Department, who said that they continue to have serious problems in enforcing their own laws and implementing significant reform measures?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Saudi is a pretty complex country. It’s got the -- all the challenges of internal terrorism and also, unfortunately, a potential for external terrorism. Collectively, the U.S. Government is working with them in all different types of area -- Treasury, Justice, State, militarily, Interior, a lot of successes.

What we like the most about the Saudi Arabians is what I mentioned in my report, is that they realize that they are under the gun; al-Qaida has chosen them as one of the apostate countries, however they prefer to define it. The Saudi Arabians have realized that they now are a target. And most importantly, with their internal de-radicalization programs, the thing that I mentioned to you before, they treat the individual as a victim, not necessarily as a culprit. And that’s consistent with their culture. That’s consistent with the program they have in place that is being well resourced and will extend for quite a while.

So, in some areas, there is great success in Saudi Arabia. In some areas, there is not necessarily great success. They’re still partners, they’re still on the team, and they’re still helping us.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: On Venezuela, could you expand a little bit more on what you think Hugo Chavez is up to? I mean, last year, there was some talk about possibly, would Venezuela be put on the list. Do you think that they’re moving -- on the state sponsor of terrorism list. When you talk about deepening ties with Iran, deepening ties with Cuba, cooperation with the FARC, do you think of Venezuela is moving in the direction of being a state sponsor of terrorism?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Venezuela was on the not fully cooperating list in ’06. They’ll be on the same not fully cooperating list in ’07.

QUESTION: But I mean --

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: We won’t speculate about whether it could possibly be on the state sponsorship list.

QUESTION: But I mean, it seems like it’s very concerning -- I mean, it seems like it’s a very concerning trend. Forget about not cooperating with efforts; it seems that it’s the total antithesis of that, or that they’re actually supporting terrorism.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: When we see enough indications that that’s the case, we would consider moving them off of the fully cooperating -- or keeping them on the not fully cooperating and moving towards state sponsorship. We don’t see all that right now.

QUESTION: Can you just -- I’m sorry, just to push you a little bit. Could you expand on your concerns about what they’re up to with this cooperation with the FARC, deepening with Iran? What do you think is going on here?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: We are concerned about it. We’re watching it very carefully. But I don’t -- prefer not to speculate on Venezuela and what’s actually our speculation and not good, solid information on that.

Yes, sir. Eric.

QUESTION: Ambassador Dailey, can you say why you might have any more confidence that this agreement that the Pakistani Government is negotiating with militants – why even more confidence this agreement will work as where others have failed in the past?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: This has gotten an awful lot of attention from the United States, the one reason. The second reason, they’ve just got a new government in. And if you look at what was elected and who were elected in particular spots, you’ll see in the FATA area where the MMA was before, the 45 seats they had in the parliament, they lost them all but five. A prominent Taliban individual in the FATA area lost his seat; that this government has a chance to really move forward in its own security internally.

So we think that this treaty lays the groundwork for them to be successful in that area, keeping in line that military may be a part of the tool and keeping in line that the foundation has to be a political resolution in the long run. Couple that with the economic and the social development plan and the military development plan that the United States is funding at a tune of $150 million a year for the next five years, and a large amount of money from the Pakistanis.

We think that all the tools are in place for this treaty to have the -- a successful outcome. They certainly know the United States is watching it and will articulate our concerns if it turns out to be not as successful as the one in the past.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: Do you have any written proof that proves any relationship between the Ecuadorian Government and the FARC? And also, I would like to know why are you waiting for -- to include Venezuela in the list that supports terrorists if you -- looks like have, you know, proofs.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Let me answer the first one. I think there is a connection because, whether Ecuador liked it or not, Raul Reyes and his folks were killed in their territory. So Ecuador is not securing its borders as we’d like. They’ve got 14 posts and they’ve had, I think, 40-some ambushes or attacks in that area. But the connection is they’ve been using their terrain.

What was your second question?

QUESTION: Why are you waiting for to include Venezuela in the list of the countries that support terrorists? And I ask you this because it looks like you have enough proofs.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: At this point, we don’t think we have enough proof. As we -- as indicators present themselves, we’ll take a look at it and analyze it and compare it; and if we think it’s appropriate, then we will move them towards a state sponsor of terrorism. But we’re not there yet.

Yes, ma’am, in the red outfit, please.

QUESTION: I’d like to ask about North Korea. The U.S. recently revealed the evidence of North Korea cooperating with Syria in building nuclear reactors. Nuclear technology transfer is separate from state sponsor of terrorism? That’s the one.

And the second one is how is it going to affect the United States negotiation with the North Korea in terms of taking them off the list?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: We have been looking at, in accordance with the six-party talks, of taking North Korea off of the state sponsorship list. It has several key parts to it. The first is the President needs to notify and get -- notify the Congress. The second is we have to do a hard and fast intelligence analysis of the previous six months to ensure they haven’t conducted any international terrorism. The third is the -- they need -- they, meaning the North Koreans, need to provide -- or other countries coming off of the list -- need to provide the United States a detailed assurance in key areas that they will not engage in terrorism.

Now, that assurance has not come back from DPRK yet. So that’s where we’re at in the process. As we go through this process, proliferation and support in Lebanon* with regards to construction has presented itself. We’re looking very carefully at those situations with our intelligence analysts to ensure we’ve got the right information as to whether those are valid or not. We’re not certain yet that that is valid information. Some of it is unfolding as we speak.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Can I just ask you about trend lines? Could you outline us with regard to Iran’s support for terror in Iraq, the trend line that you saw throughout 2007? Did you see that it intensified throughout the year?

And then, again, in Afghanistan, how did you see the trend line for al-Qaida? Is that strengthening throughout 2007?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: I’ll have to get back to you on trend lines for the al-Qaida -- correction, for Iran and Iraq. It was very disturbing to the coalition leadership, I’d say, four or five months ago. I have not pursued exactly what it is now, so I probably can’t answer that. But we’ll owe you an answer, if you get with Rhonda Shore.

And the second one was --

QUESTION: With regard to the al-Qaida strength in Afghanistan, again, the trend line (inaudible) 2007.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Be careful in Afghanistan. That’s al-Qaida/Taliban. And my visit, which was a -- is a little dated to Afghanistan was that the aggressive activity of coalition forces there has generated more contacts and generated more opportunities for casualties and encounters. So you be careful about trend lines because it may be intentionally generated by one body to the other that may end up being misleading. But let me pay you back on that also as to exactly what trend lines are taking place in Afghanistan.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Yeah, I’d like to follow up on Eric’s earlier question. As far as the -- there’s a huge increase in number of attacks and casualties in Pakistan. Is that directly related to the so-called peace agreement with the Musharraf government or indirectly related?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: I can’t say. I don’t know.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: I have a question about Nepal. You’ve got a Maoist movement there that’s designated as a terrorist organization that’s now basically formed a democratic government. Is there a sense how the U.S. wants to deal with a situation like this one?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Well, in any terrorist organization or any terrorist situation, if there is a way for reconciliation legally and lawfully through the political system, obviously, we prefer that. And there are places where that’s taking place already. It is taking place in Nepal, although it’s had some ups and downs. But we prefer a legitimate reconciliation and reintegration politically long before we go after and try and do a coordinated, integrated, with host nation military action.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: I was wondering if you can talk a little bit more about the aid that Iran and Hezbollah are providing to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and in terms of that being a traditionally secular nationalist movement, and whether you’re seeing, really, that the ideological and organizational lines are being blurred between the different Palestinian groups or whether you see that there still are, you know, distinctions in how they’re operating?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: We see no distinction in how they’re operating, that they’re still going to be as -- what’s the right word? -- parochially defined now. We expect to see that take place in the future -- parochially, in that they’ve got their own motivations and desires and animosities. So, we don’t see any change.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Looking at the numbers, it appears that deaths and injuries increased, if you take out kidnappings, in the data over 2006. Can you provide us any sort of explanation as to why you feel those numbers have gone up so dramatically?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: I’ll let Russ answer, but let me give you one angle, if I may. Suicide bombing is the, I would say, tool of choice that’s becoming more and more prevalent in the terrorist business. And it can be pretty accurate and pretty effective so long as the suicide bomber is prepared to give his life. So I would submit to you that the numbers are increasing because those -- that tool has been the asymmetric tool for folks to employ.

Russ, do you want to answer a little bit, too?

MR. TRAVERS: Yeah, I think that’s right. And even within the category of suicide bombings, you see, as we get better at preparing defenses, the suicide bombers move from vehicle-borne to just backpacks, and so they can use that to evade security protocols. I think it’s a fair statement that around the globe, people are getting increasingly efficient at killing other people. We see that in many different regions -- as I said, southern Thailand, that insurgency is up substantially, as is Somalia. Actually, very little of that was suicide bombers. It was just bombings and normal kinds of attacks on people.

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: On Pakistan, just to clarify, what are you attributing this doubling of attacks and quadrupling of fatalities? What is the main reason that that has happened?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: I think there is a deliberate effort in the FATA, where the -- there’s a bit less governmental control for them to reach out and go after mainstream Pakistan. And I think that’s why they’ve increased, is that previously, they stayed in the FATA area and did their activities amongst themselves in that region. But there has been by Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud, an effort to kind of take on and go after the Pakistan Government.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: You mentioned Raul Reyes’ attack. There were some computers found there also. How critical are those, the contents of those computers, in doing the assessment of the relationship between the Venezuelan Government and the FARC, or the Ecuadorian Government and the FARC?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: I don’t know what’s on them, but I can be candid with you in the fact that exploitation of a location where computers come up will always provide something interesting, either from the immediate group right there or even some long shots that surprise us. That -- those laptops or hard drives are being looked at, I think, still by the Colombian Government, and I think they’ll be pretty revealing. It’ll be dependent on what they want to do with regards to releasing; but just like yourselves, if someone got your computer, you’d figure out -- someone would figure out real quick who you’re talking to, what you’re saying, and it can be pretty revealing. And we think -- I think -- I speculate that that might be pretty darn revealing.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: Can I continue on Venezuela, please? You mentioned in the report these ties between Iran and Venezuela, and you cite these flights. But what other evidence do you have of the deepening ties, and do you think that these deepening ties are of a nature to support Iran’s terrorist activities? Do you have any evidence of that?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Like I said before, you know, I guess I would say the evidence is anecdotal; it’s not trend. I think we do have people having come through. I think there’s a transfer of funding with Iran and Venezuela in some related economic oil deals. I think there’s enough for us to be worthy of watching. I’m not confident what all the specifics are.

QUESTION: You mentioned that Iran was helping the Taliban, and you gave some specifics of that. Can you elaborate a little bit more on exactly how that’s happening and what you understand of that relationship to be? When Ayman Zawahiri spoke recently, he went into great detail about how al-Qaida hates Iran. So you -- is it now that the Taliban is getting help from two mortal enemies that are both terrorist groups?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Yeah, I think it’s pretty shrewd by the Iranians to keep the pot stirred up on the Afghan side that’s got coalition forces fighting, particularly the United States, where there’s a Sunni-Shia difference of opinion. That’s fine; let’s keep sending arms over there to just keep the coalition forces, the United States in particular but probably others, embroiled and busy and distracted. Because the last thing I would suspect the Iranians want is a totally pacified Afghanistan with a U.S. base on their immediate eastern side.

QUESTION: But is it part of any strategic alliance or is it just sort of meddling?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: It’s prudent -- prudent meddling.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION: For North Korea to be de-listed, how much do they directly have to address the elements, the issues which are listed on this report, such as the returning of the Red Army or explaining about the abductees? How much do they have to do for the assessment?

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: I’m not -- I’ll be candid -- I’m not privy to what the assurances said, which was no future international terrorism activities. We would like them to resolve the abductee issue with Japan. We think that’s very important and we give them every opportunity and encourage them to do so. There is a forum to do that, the bilateral forum that was established in, I think, February of ’07. So we would encourage them to resolve that and others as much as they can. They are -- it’s important that Japan and Korea work out these type issues, because we think that shows good faith.

Yes, sir. Okay, I think that’s all. I need to turn it back over to the team here. And those IOUs, please get with Rhonda Shore here on your left-hand side.

___________

*Syria

2008/341

Released on April 30, 2008